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Vietnam. Ellsberg served as the action
officer for Vietnam, reporting personally to John McNaughton, Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara’s principal assistant for Vietnam. Ellsberg became convinced that every president
knew that his commitments would
prove insufficient to accomplish the
goal of preserving South Vietnam’s independence. However, none of them
could withdraw American support—
because a communist victory in South
Vietnam would create an unbearable
political liability in the Cold War climate
of “wars of national liberation” backed
by the Soviets and China.
Ellsberg went to work as McNaughton’s
aide for Vietnam on 4 August 1964.
On that day his office was receiving
live reports of North Vietnamese
patrol-boat attacks on the U.S. destroyer Maddox, the presence of which
off North Vietnam was one of several
provocations staged by the Johnson
administration to elicit a military reaction from Hanoi. The administration
publicly claimed that two distinct sets
of attacks were made, first on the
Maddox and a short time later on the
Maddox and a sister ship, USS Turner
Joy. Drawing on his direct experience
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ellsberg demonstrates that Maddox’s skipper raised doubts about the
second set of attacks within a few hours
of announcing them. The Johnson administration nonetheless went to Congress describing both attacks as bona
fide, because together they appeared to
justify a long-planned escalation of the
air war. Once armed by Congress with
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Johnson
made a few direct retaliatory air strikes
and then posed as the presidential peace
candidate. He was running against
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Republican Barry Goldwater, who was
advocating precisely the kind of sustained air campaign that Johnson had
already planned and would begin once
safely reelected president.
One can applaud or condemn Daniel
Ellsberg for what he did in 1971. What
one cannot do is ignore the power his
memoir has to inform Americans about
how the executive branch conducted its
foreign policy and military strategy
from the 1940s until 1974. As the
United States apparently heads (at this
writing) toward another major war, the
skeptic is entitled to wonder if things at
the top have really changed.
KEN HAGAN

Professor of Strategy
Naval War College—Monterey, California

Rohwer, Jürgen, and Mikhail S. Monakov. Stalin’s Ocean-Going Fleet: Soviet Naval Strategy and
Shipbuilding Programmes, 1935–1953. Portland,
Ore.: Frank Cass, 2001. 334pp. $57.50

The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the opening of major Russian archives
have provided an opportunity to add
greatly to our understanding of the
character of the Soviet navy. Eminent
researchers Jürgen Rohwer and Mikhail
S. Monakov have contributed much to
this understanding with their study of
Soviet naval shipbuilding and strategy
when Josef Stalin controlled the development of the Soviet Navy, from 1935
until his death in 1953. They have uncovered extensive details of the massive
shipbuilding program, most of which
never came to fruition. Strategy, however, remains as murky as ever. This
study complements but does not replace Monakov’s series of articles on
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Soviet naval doctrine and Stalin’s fleet
in Morskoi sbornik, 1992–98, or Robert
W. Herrick’s Soviet Naval Theory and
Policy: Gorshkov’s Inheritance (1989).
At the end of 1935 Stalin personally
yanked the Soviet navy from littoral defense through air, submarine, and light
surface forces into a grandiose shipbuilding program centered on large
battleships and battle cruisers, while
retaining “Young School” craving for
submarines. Stalin took naval strategy
into his own hands but never divulged
any strategic precepts or plans to his
naval leaders, who in fear of Stalin’s
wrath dutifully adapted themselves to
the imposed scheme, several falling to
the purges anyway. The result was a
massive shipbuilding program and a
naval officer corps stranded in a strategic wilderness, with silent misgivings
about the apparent dissonance between
the projected force structure and operational commitments arising from the
Soviet Union’s particular geostrategic
position.
By 1939 an immense program had
evolved to build twenty-four powerful
battleships by 1947, with fifteen for the
Pacific Fleet and the rest divided among
the Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern
Fleets. Concurrent plans called for a
submarine force intended to reach 438
units, of which 219 were earmarked for
the Pacific. These fleet goals, along with
a modicum of light surface forces, were
impossible for Soviet shipbuilding capacity, even by halting merchant ship
construction. With the onset of the
Great Patriotic War, all long-term projects were suspended; only submarine
and light surface projects continued, as
circumstances allowed. The defeat of
the Axis saw the prewar schemes reduced to three battleships and three
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battle cruisers, all of which were cancelled when Stalin died. The Sverdlov-class
cruisers and a new submarine force of
284 boats became the shrunken legacy
of Stalin’s naval dreams.
The navy of Admiral Nikolai
Kuznetsov, under army operational
control but without strategic direction
from the General Staff or the top, continued to orient itself before, during,
and after World War II toward traditional defensive roles—defeating attacking enemy fleets and amphibious
expeditions in the near seas—with only
a limited submarine offensive on adjacent enemy sea lines of communications.
Stalin’s motive for building a battleship
fleet, according to the authors, was the
vision of the Soviet Union gaining supremacy in the four near seas and then
becoming an oceanic power, with the
battleship or battle cruiser “a symbol
of the highest grade of power, a most
powerful and mobile instrument of
power politics, that the world had
ever known,” the direct predecessor of
the atomic bomb in attaining superpower status.
Stalin, however, left no direct evidence
of his reasons, whereas several indicators point toward a dominant mental
construct of positional strategic defense still guiding Stalin and his admirals. He and his naval leaders agreed
on a defense strategy but diverged on
preferred force structure. Stalin rejected the aircraft carrier, despite all
the evidence from the Second World
War of the importance of airpower at
sea for a blue-water navy. Kuznetsov
often pleaded in vain with Stalin for
stronger shipboard antiaircraft defenses on ships, for aircraft carriers to
cover surface forces from enemy air
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attack out to three hundred miles from
naval bases, and to limit Soviet
land-based air support. In 1946,
Kuznetsov’s close associate Admiral
Vladimir Alafuzov developed a positional scheme of supremacy under
land-based air cover up to one hundred miles from naval bases, and conditional sea control by large surface
vessels with limited air support in a
“far zone” out to three hundred miles.
This fell short of command of the expanses of the Barents, Baltic, and Black
Seas or of most of the Sea of Japan.
Only submarines with long endurance
could operate in the open ocean, but
Stalin preferred medium submarines,
conceived for operations in near seas
against an amphibious threat. The projected battleships would have had an
operational radius only half that of
their contemporaries in oceanic navies. Only current Italian battleships,
also designed for near seas, had such
limited autonomy. To operate across
the open ocean was a ludicrous concept to Stalin in 1945, arguing for a
defensive posture for at least ten to fifteen years to come. Stalin’s projected
“large sea and oceanic navy,” to use
the Soviet term, was likely created for
a hoped-for more robust traditional
strategic defensive in contiguous seas.
The evidence in this book, if not its
title, lends support to Herrick’s judgment of a Stalinist strategy of limited
command of the near seas. To suggest
that it was “the first step on the road
to global naval power,” as does series
editor Holger Herwig in the preface,
would require Stalin and his navy to
demonstrate a conceptual leap for
which neither had shown a proclivity.
Mind-sets resist change. Even in the
navy of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who
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inherited Stalin’s schemes and built up
Kuznetsov’s fleet, extensive deployments did not replace deeply held
positional and defensive assumptions.
Had Stalin’s “oceanic” fleet actually
been built, whether a shift of orientation by him or his admirals toward
“global naval power” would have occurred remains undemonstrated and
problematic.
WILLARD C. FRANK, JR.

Old Dominion University

Buker, George E. The Penobscot Expedition: Commodore Saltonstall and the Massachusetts Conspiracy of 1779. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press,
2002. 195pp. $32.95

In the various history books on the
American Revolution, the Penobscot
expedition is rarely mentioned in any
detail, being overshadowed by the more
widely known and successful battles
and campaigns. Perhaps this is due to
the dismal outcome of this early joint
amphibious operation and to the desire
by some, especially Massachusetts politicians of the time, to forget what had
happened.
This hastily conceived expedition was
launched from Boston in July 1779. The
expedition was given the task of expelling the mounting British military
presence on coastal Maine, centered
around Penobscot Bay, but specifically
at Castine. The expedition set off with
full expectation of success on the part
of the Massachusetts political leadership. But from the beginning, the force
assembled was hampered by inadequate
leadership, divided command authority, poor training and support, and a
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